Introduction
There are two main types of models that attempt to describe default processes in the credit risk literature: structural and reduced form models. Structural models use the evolution of rms structural variables, such as asset and debt values, to determine the time of default. In these models, it is usually characterized as the rst hitting time of the rm's asset value (modeled as a diusion) to a given boundary determined by the rm's liabilities. This time of default is usually a predictable stopping time. In contrast, reduced form models do not consider the relation between default and rm value in an explicit manner and the credit events are specied in terms of some exogenous given jump processes. It is possible to distinguish between the reduced-form models that are only concerned with the modeling of the time of default, called the intensity-based models, and those with migrations between credit rating classes, called the credit migration models. In this approach the time of default is a totally inaccessible stopping time. Reviews of credit risk models can be found in many books, including among others Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) , Due and Singleton (2003) , Schönbucher (2003) , and Lando (2004) .
A quick look at the above description could lead one to conclude that structural and reducedform models are competing paradigms. However, an intrinsic connection between these two approaches has been pointed out in the last decade by several authors. Actually it is possible to show that structural models can be viewed as reduced-form models by secondary markets that have only incomplete information. In the seminal paper, Due and Lando (2001) , the rm asset value is modeled as a continuous-time process but the market has only at discrete point times a noisy accounting report of this value and knows the default history of the rm. In this setting, Due and Lando establish that the default time admits an intensity that is proportional to the derivative of the conditional density of the rm's value at the default barrier. Structural models with incomplete information have also been studying by Kusuoka (1999) pricing models where default intensities are driven by some factor process which are not directly observable by investors in secondary markets. Their information set only consists of the default history and of observation of noisy prices for traded credit securities.
Our paper considers credit migration models with partial information and studies the inuence of a decit of information on prices of credit linked securities. It diers from the previous contributions in several directions: First, instead of using a single credit rating intensity based model, we rather work in a multiple credit ratings framework where we can look in greater details at the changes in credit quality that may lead to default. The transitions through the various credit classes are modeled via a homogeneous continuous time Markov chains. Second, with this framework, it is possible by using the properties of Phase-type distributions to derive some explicit pricing formulas for the prices of risky bonds and options on these risky bonds. The inuence of a decit of information is easily quantied without requiring intensive simulation of the credit rating. Third, with regard to information, we consider a framework of discretely delayed ltrations as introduced in Guo et al. (2009) , i.e. no new information ow in between two consecutive observation times as long as the issuer defaults. Finally, we propose in this framework, a simple contagion models to price credit derivatives on two rms. Remark that models proposed in this work could be adapted to model queuing systems with incomplete information, such these studied by Xiaoqiang et al. (2009) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider several models with one issuer under three discontinued ows of information. First, we assume that investors observe the issuer's rating only at discrete and deterministic points with a xed delay. Second, we assume that information arrives randomly, but exogenously, according to a Poisson process.
Third, we assume that the ratings are observed at deterministic points or when transitions lead the Markov chain to a class with a lower credit rating than the last rating known. In this way information also arrives randomly, but according to an endogenous rule. We infer in the three settings bonds and options prices and we provide an explicit description of the dynamics of bond prices under real and pricing measures. In Section 3, we consider a contagion model with two issuers and analyze the cross eects of a decit of information and contagion on bonds prices and correlation of default times. We discuss the models of the two previous sections conclude the paper by numerical illustrations in Section 4.
2 Several models for one issuer's bond with three types of partial information
In this section, we propose three models to price corporate or sovereign bonds under a discontinued ow of information. The rm or the country that issues the bond is marked in a rating system counting L levels. The levels 1 and L − 1 correspond respectively to the highest and to the lowest credit qualities. When the issuer reaches the level L, it goes into bankruptcy and the bond pays R, the recovery rate, at maturity T . Information about the current rating is carried by (X t ), a continuous-time, time-homogeneous Markov chain dened on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) where P denotes the real probability measure. The Markov chain takes its values in a nite state space E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e L } where e i is the i-th vector of the standard basis of R L (the j-th component of e i is the Kronecker delta, δ i,j , for
The elements of Γ satisfy the following conditions
Γ is related to the probability of transition from rating i to j, on a period of time ∆t, as follows
where denotes the transpose operator and exp (Γ∆t) is the exponential of the matrix Γ∆t. Given that the issuer defaults when it reaches the rating L, the matrix of intensities can be rewritten in the following block form
where Id L−1 is the identity matrix of dimension L − 1. The product DX t is then the vector of the L − 1 rst elements of X t . We assume that the state e L is the only recurrent state of the chain. In this setting, the time of default, τ = inf {t > 0 : X t = e L }, has a Phase-type distribution and the probability of survival is given by (see e.g. Rolski et al. (2009) 
Let us introduce the following processes
It is well-known that M i,j t is a F-martingale under the measure P (see e.g. Lemma 11.2.3 in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) ).
We may now identify the dynamics of the rating process (X t ) under the pricing measure Q. To achieve this goal, we assume that (X t ) is also a time-homogeneous Markov chain dened by a L × L matrix of intensities of transition, denoted by A = (a i,j ) i,j=1,2,...L , that satises the same types of conditions as for Γ. Since Q is an equivalent measure to P , the matrix A can be rewritten 
and is such that the generators of (X t ) under P and Q are respectively Γ and A. The time of default has also a Phase-type distribution under the pricing measure Q and the probability of survival is now given by
The use of continuous-time, time-homogeneous Markov-chain to model transitions between credit rating has been rst proposed by Jarrow et al. (1997) . Here we further assume that the dynamics of (X t ) under Q is also time-homogeneous to exploit the properties of Phase-type distributions and to discuss the inuence of a decit of information. However note that it is possible to weaken this assumption and generalize our result by considering extensions to take into account memory and stochastic transitions as in Arvanitis et al. (1999 
A rst model for the defaultable bond with information at xed dates
In practice, the credit quality of issuers is only assessed at discrete times, when credit rating agencies assign and publish credit ratings for issuers. No information on the credit worthiness is available between these times as long as the issuer defaults (which is supposed to be instantaneously observed). In this section, we assume that times of credit rating publications, 0 = t
n = T , are non random and that they integrate a delay, δ, due to the time needed for verication of the issuer's credit-worthiness. We denote by t i = t this seems to be a realistic assumption as long as it can be assumed that investors observe ratings when credit rating agencies provide their annual or quarterly reports.
If H t is the indicator variable 1 {τ >t} , equal to one if the issuer is still solvent, the information available to the secondary market is represented by the ltration {G t , t ≤ T } where the sigma algebra G t at time t ∈ [t
As our purpose is to illustrate the impact of the lack of information on bond prices, we assume that the risk free rate, noted r, is constant. This assumption can easily be released without introducing major modications in the main results of the paper.
Let us denote by P (t, T ) the price at time t ≤ T of a zero-coupon bond, that delivers one monetary unit at maturity T . The price of the defaultable bond is equal to the expected discounted payo of the bond, conditionally to the available information
2)
The following proposition gives an explicit expression for P (t, T ).
All proofs are in section 6. Note that, if the issuer is still solvent at time t = t (p)
i −, we observe a jump in the price of amplitude 
i+1 ) and i = 0, ..., n − 1, the price of the zero coupon bond is given by (see Section 6.2 for a proof )
We now derive the dynamics of the zero coupon bond under the reduced ltration by using the innovations approach.
i+1 ) for some i = 0, ..., n − 1. The dynamics of the bond price under Q and with partial information is given by
It is also possible to give the dynamics of the bond price under P and with partial information by using Equation (2.1). Suppose that t ∈ (t
We nally focus on the calculation of the price of an call option on this zero coupon bond with maturity S ≤ T and strike price K:
The interest rate being deterministic, the only factor of risk is the default risk.
S ) and of strike price K is given by
is dened by Equation (2.3) and
2.2 A second model for the defaultable bond with information at exogenous random times
In the previous model, the credit quality was available at discrete and deterministic times. We now assume that the rating is disclosed at random times till bankruptcy according to a homogeneous
Poisson process (if the company or country is in default, no more information is disclosed). The random times of (possible) rating disclosures are denoted by Z k , k ≥ 0. The intervals of time between two successive publication dates of rating, U k = Z k − Z k−1 , are assumed to be independent and identically distributed as exponential random variables with mean ν −1 under the real probability P . Moreover they are independent of the Markov chain (X t ). The number of possible rating disclosures at time t is denoted by N t and the number of real rating disclosures at time t is denoted by N r t . Its distribution under P is given by
We assume that (N t ) is a homogeneous Poisson process of intensity λ under the pricing measure Q. As in the rst model, we introduce the cost of information, κ P , such that
By virtue of Proposition 11.2.3 in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002), the probability measure Q is dened by the product of Radon Nikodyn densities η t and ζ t given respectively by
and is such that generators of (X t ) under P and Q are Γ and A respectively and that the frequencies of information arrivals under P and Q are respectively ν and λ.
The information available to the market is represented by the ltration {G t , t ≤ T } that carries now information about the disclosure dates, the rating at these times and the occurrence of default. The sigma algebra G t is then given by
The price of the defaultable bond is equal to the expected discounted payo of the bond, conditionally to the available information
and has the same expression as in the previous model. Proposition 2.6. The price at time t of a zero coupon of maturity T is
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1 and is left for the reader who may easily supply the details. We now focus on the dynamics of the price of the defaultable bond.
Proposition 2.7. The dynamics at time t of the bond price under Q and with partial information is given by
whereM 0 t and is a (G, Q)-martingale. Remark 2.8. It is also possible to give the dynamics of the bond price under P and with partial
where (M
Corollary 2.9. The expected return of the bond is equal to the risk free rate
We now focus on the calculation of the price of an option on this zero coupon bond,
Proposition 2.10. Let us denote by z = Z N r t , the date of the last rating disclosure before time t. The price of a call option of exercise date S and of strike price K is given by the following expression
is the density of the time of the last rating disclosure,
, in the interval of time [t, S] given that τ > S,
with δ(.) the Dirac function.
A third model for the defaultable bond with information at endogenous dates
In this last model, we assume that the rating is disclosed at discrete and deterministic times
n = T , but also at random and endogenous times, when transitions lead the Markov chain to a class with a lower credit rating than the last rating known. This is a more realistic assumption since credit rating agencies not only provide ratings for their annual reports, but also when the credit worthiness of the rm or of the country becomes worse than the last known rating could let to predict. This assumption introduces a kind of asymmetry in the information arrival process: an improvement of credit worthiness is not immediately disclosed, contrary to worsening. We denote by 0 = Z 0 ≤ Z 1 ≤ . . . the times of rating disclosures (deterministic times as well as at random times).and by N r t the number of rating disclosures before time t. The information available to the market is represented by the ltration {G t , t ≤ T } where G t is then given by
The rating of the issuer at time t is denoted by R t and is equal to the scalar product of X t and of the L dimensional vector (1, 2, . . . , L) . The price of the defaultable bond has not the same expression as in the previous models because the length between the last rating disclosure is now informative. Let us introduce three families of matrices: for rating R = 1, ..., L − 1
Proposition 2.11. The price at time t of a zero coupon of maturity T is
We now derive the dynamics of the zero coupon bond under the reduced ltration.
Proposition 2.12. Suppose that t ∈ (t
The dynamics of the bond price under Q and with partial information is given by
The pricing of options in this model is more complex than in the previous models because the density of the time of the last rating disclosure before the exercise date of the option is intricate.
However, it is possible to price an option when the exercise date of the option, S, corresponds to a deterministic date of information disclosure t (p) i for some i = 1, ..., n.
Proposition 2.13. Let us denote by z = Z N r t , the date of the last rating disclosure before time t. Assume that there exists i = 1, ..., n such that S = t (p)
i . The price of a call option of exercise date S ≥ t and of strike price K is given by the following expression
is dened by Equation (2.7) and More precisely, we consider two issuers Y and Z such that the probabilities of bankruptcy of each one is aected by the default of the other actor.
Both issuers are marked in a rating system counting L levels. Information about current ratings is still carried by a continuous Markov chain (X t ), dened on (Ω, F, P ). 
2 , then the ratings are equal to
in default) and the rating of Z is given by
and the rating of Y is given by
-if X t = e j for j = L 2 , then both ratings are equal to L.
The sets of states in which Y and Z are in default are respectively given by
We denote by τ
Z the times of rms default.
Of course we assume that at t = 0, both issuers are not in default such that 
We provide in section 4.4 a detailed example in which the scale of ratings counts three levels so as to visualize the structure of the matrix A in a simple setting. We also denote B and b the following submatrices of A
) and is 0 otherwise. Finally to characterize the dynamics of ratings of Y or Z when the other issuer has defaulted, we introduce the following
We now assume that the credit quality of issuers is only assessed at discrete (and non random) times 0 = t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ . . . ≤ t n = T . The information available to the market is represented by the ltration {G t , t ≤ T } where the sigma algebra G t at time t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ) is now dened by
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ) for some i = 0, ..., n − 1, then the price of bonds of maturity T issued by Y and Z are given by the following expressions.
where
In this setting, we are also able to calculate the correlation between default events. Proposition 3.2. Suppose that t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ) for some i = 0, ..., n − 1, then the correlation between default events are provided by
are dened by Equation (3.1) and (3.2), and
Remark 3.3. The pricing of options in the contagion model is much more complex than in model with a single entity. However, it is possible to price an option on a basket of two zero coupon bonds with weights (ω Y , ω Z ) when both actors issue zero coupon bonds of same maturity and when the exercise date of the option, S, corresponds to a date of information disclosure t S . Suppose that t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ) for some i = 0, ..., n − 1. The price of a call option of exercise date S and of strike price K is given by the next expression (see Section (6.13)) where
ZS (e i , t S , t S , ty, T ), Note that at the time of writing this paper, the last publication of information dates from the 13th of January 2012: S&P downgraded France from AAA to AA+ and correspond to a delay of information equal to 0.2219. In the remainder of this section, we will try to understand how the decit of information aects prices of bonds and options. For this purpose, we compare zero coupon bonds prices for each rating and for maturities that range from 1 to 20 years. In our rst set of tests, we assume that the rating has been disclosed for the last time, a half year ago (t i = −0.5) and the interest rate is set to r = 2%. A credit spread is retrieved by the inverting the formula:
In a second set of tests, bond prices are computed under the assumption that information about ratings is available at the date of calculation (which is equivalent to set t i = 0). Credit spreads are in this case noted spread(t i = 0). The part of the credit spread related to the decit of information is then calculated as the following dierence:
spread attributed to information = spread(t i = −0.5) − spread(t i = 0) The evolution of the part of spreads attributable to the information delay is displayed in the left graph of Figure 4 .1, for bonds issued by AA, A and BBB issuers. We observe that the decit of information does not have the same impact on every rating. For AA and A bonds, the part of spreads attributable to the information is positive and increasing with the maturity. This trend can be explained by the fact that a half year after the last rating disclosure, the country can be downgraded with non negligible probabilities. More surprising, the fraction of credit spreads linked to the lack of information is decreasing for BBB issuers. This is probably related to the fact that if the country is not in default after 6 months, the probability of being in a higher rating is high and credit spreads are then lower than if the rating was disclosed today.
Finally, we have tested the inuence of the delay between the last disclosure of information and the date of bonds issuance. The left graph of gure 4.1 presents the part of spreads attributable to the information delay, for dierent time lag: t i = −1.5, −1, −0.5 and for A rated bonds. For this category of bonds, the higher is the delay of disclosure, the higher is the cost of this lack of information.
We have priced call options on a zero coupon bond of maturity 10 years and of rating B. The recovery rate is still null. The exercise date is set to S = 5 years and strikes ranges from 0.65 to 0.90. The left graph of gure 4.2 presents options prices for t i = −4 to -1 years and t S = 4 years. The right graph of gure 4.2 presents options prices for t i = 0 years and t S = 2 to 3 years. We clearly see in both cases that the higher is the decit of information, the higher are options prices.
Model with information at exogenous random dates.
In this section, we test the model in which the information about the real rating of the issuer is published at random times. As in the previous paragraph, we work with the matrix of sovereign transition rates of table 4.1. The formula of bond prices being identical to the one of the previous model, we limit our analyze to option prices. 
Model with information at endogenous random dates.
In this section, we assess numerically the credit spread of bonds, when the information is disclosed at xed times and when a credit worsening occurs. As mentioned earlier, this assumption introduces asymmetry in the information arrival process. We still work with the matrix of sovereign transition rates of table 4.1. Figure 4 .5 presents the credit spreads, such as dened by (4.1), for a BBB zero coupon bond. The risk free rate is 2% and two scenarios are considered: when the last rating has been published one and two years ago. We also reported on the gure, the spreads of BBB bond, when the information is not endogenous. We observe that spreads are lower when the information is endogenous. This observation can be justied as follows: when the information is fully exogenous, the probability that the country has in fact a lower rating than the last one reported, is not null. It is not the case when the information is endogenous: in case of worsening of the economic situation of the country, the rating is adjusted and disclosed immediately. The fact that the country has not been downgraded since one or two years, gives us an indication that the country has the same or a higher rating. Similar conclusions can be drawn for options prices: the endogeneity attenuates the impact of the delay of information.
Model with contagion.
So as to present explicitly the matrix A, we work under the assumption that the scale of ratings count three levels and that the issuersY and Z cannot default at the same time. Furthermore, we assume that, when both issuers are in activity, matrix of intensities, ruling the marginal evolution of ratings, are identical and such that the one year probabilities of transition are: In the following tests, we have set α = 0.8 and β = 1.2. The risk free rate is still equal to 2% while the recovery rate is null. When required, the default times t z and t y have been set to −0.5. The last disclosure is at the date of the issuance, t i = 0. Figure 4 .6 exhibits the dierence between credit spreads computed with and without contagion (situation in which α = 1 and β = 1). As we could expect, for the chosen values of α and β, if Y collapses before Z, the probability of bankruptcy of this last issuer decreases and the spreads follow the same trend. In the opposite case, the default of Z directly raises the probability of default of Y and increases the spreads. In gure 4.7, we plot the correlation between the one year default times (1 τ Y <T and 1 τ Z <T ), for dierent levels of contagion. α is set to 1, while β varies from 0.5 to 3. Two couples of rating are considered: (R Y , R Z ) =(1,1) and (2,2). The graph reveals that the rating directly aects the level of correlation of default times. When β = 1, default times are independent. For lower or higher β's, the correlation is respectively negative or positive. We also observe that the decit of information directly inuences the correlation. If the last rating disclosure has been made 3 years ago, the correlation is higher (for (R Y , R Z ) =(1,1)) or lower (for(R Y , R Z ) =(2,2)) than in case of a recent disclosure. Figure 4 .8 illustrates the inuence of the information delay on the price of a basket option for dierent strikes. The exercise date is set to 5 years and the maturity of both bonds is 10 years. The risk free and recovery rates are respectively 2% and 0%. The ratings are set to (R Y , R Z ) =(2,2) and the weights of the basket are ω Y = ω Z = 50% . As in previous section, a lack of recent information raises the option prices. Conclusions.
This paper explores a new use of Phase-type distributions in credit risk under dierent ows of incomplete information. In particular, it details the inuence of discontinuity and delay of information on prices of credit linked securities, in a credit rating system. In the rst model considered, information about the rating arrives at predetermined dates. In this framework, we infer prices of zero coupon bonds, their dynamics in continuous time, and prices of call options.
Numerical applications reveal that a decit of information raises most of the time credit spreads and option prices but the impact varies considerably across ratings. In the second model studied, information is disclosed at random times. This assumption is more realistic and aects mainly the dynamics of bonds and option prices. In the third model ratings is disclosed at non random dates or when the credit worthiness of the rm or of the country becomes worse than the last known rating could let to predict. This asymmetry in the information arrival process reduces the impact of information delay on credit spreads. In the last model presented, we propose a contagion model for two issuers, when information ows at xed dates. Numerical applications show us that a decit of information aects either positively or negatively the correlation between default times. 6 Proofs 6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 Equation (2.2) can be developed as follows
and according to the Bayes' rule
Proof for Equation 2.4
The price of the defaultable bond is given by
The rst expectation can be developed as follows
The Laplace transform of τ is given by (see e.g. Rolski et al. (2009))
and therefore
Finally, the expectation can be rewritten as follows
The second expectation has already been calculated in the proof of Proposition 2.1, and is equal
The last expectation is calculated as follows:
Proof of Proposition 2.3
By Proposition 2.1, we get that for t ∈ (t
First, note that, according to the denition of γ, its derivative is equal to
Second, let us characterize the martingale representation of H t under the market ltration G. Recall that the rating R t is equal to the scalar product of X t and of the L dimensional vector Let us now recall that:
2. For any progressively measurable process ψ t with E
We can then infer that
is a (G, Q) martingale. Moreover we have
and the probability that the issuer has the rating j at time t is calculated by the Bayes' rule
Combining equations (6.2) and (6.1) allows us to rewrite the dynamics of the zero coupon bond price as follows
Third, it remains to prove that
to conclude. According to the denition of A, we know that (see Rolski et al. (2009) ) that
Then, for j = L, we have that
By construction, the vector b is the vector with components a j,L for j = 1...L − 1 and it
which ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
According to Proposition 2.1, the price of the call can be rewritten as follows
The expectation in the second term of equation (6.4) is equal to
S).
So as to lighten future calculations, we use the notation
The expectation in the rst term of Equation (6.4) becomes then
Given that the default state is absorbing, we have for j = L that
Proof of Proposition 2.7
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3, excepted that we have now a jump component related to the disclosure of information. If the last date of rating disclosure before t is Z N r t− = z, then according to the bond price formula, the dierential of P (t, T ) is given by
The optional projection of H t on G t is built as in Proposition 2.3. To conclude note that (N t ) is G-adapted and is therefore equal to its optional projection E (N t | G t ).
Proof of Corollary 2.9
Let Z N r t− = z be the last date of rating disclosure before t. As E (dN r t | G t ) = λH t dt and given thatM 0 t and is a (G, Q)-martingale, we obtain from Equation (2.6) that
On another side, we have
Equation (6.6) can then be rewritten as follows
Since (X t ) is a Markov process, we have the relation
that allows us to infer that
and that Remember that V is the date of the last rating disclosure, before time S, V = Z N r S . According to the proof of Proposition (2.5) (see Equation (6.4)), the price of the call can be rewritten as follows
S).
So as to lighten future calculations, we denote
The expectation in the rst term of equation (6.7) becomes then
We note f V (v) the density of the last rating disclosure before time S. If n information disclosures have occurred, the times Z 1 ...Z n are unordered random variables, distributed as iid uniform (see Rolski et al. 2009, p157) . Then, f V (v) that is dened for v ≤ S, can be written as the following
The expectation in Equation (6.8) can then be rewritten as follows
Proof of Proposition 2.11
As in the proof of Proposition (2.1), we have
As the numerator of this last equation is equal to
we get the result.
Proof of Proposition 2.12
By Proposition 2.11, we get that for t ∈ (t
To simplify further calculations, let us denote:
First, note that, according to the denition ofγ, its derivative is equal to
Second, as in the proof of Proposition 2.3,we can then infer that If we insert (6.11) (6.12) (6.13) (6.14) in (6.10), we can infer the existence a (G, Q) martingale (M 
Proof of Proposition 2.13
According to the proof of Proposition (2.5) (see Equation (6.4)), the price of the call can be rewritten as follows C(t, S, K, T ) = e −r(S−t) E Q H S e −r(T −S) (R + (1 − R)γ(X S , S, S, T )) − K + |G t H t + 1 − E Q (H S |G t ) H t e −r(S−t) e −r(T −S) R − K + .
First note that
E (H S |G t ) =γ(X z , z, t, S).
So as to lighten future calculations, we use the notation g(X t S ) = e −r(T −S) (R + (1 − R)γ(X S , S, S, T )) − K + .
The expectation in the rst term of Equation (6.4) becomes then E Q H S e −r(T −S) (R + (1 − R)γ(X S , S, S, T )) − K
g(e j )P Q ( X s = e j | G t )
g(e j ) l≤R Z N r t P Q ( X s = e j | X t = e l ) P Q (X t = e l | G t ) . 
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We use the result of Assaf et al. (1983) that provides an analytical formula of the joint probability of survival of both issuers and the Bayes' rule to prove that
We can conclude by noticing that 
By using the result of Assaf et al. (1983) 
Finally, we have that
= γ Y (X ti , t i , t, T ) 1 − γ Y (X ti , t i , t, T ) .
Proof for Equation 3.5
The relation (3.5) is the expectation of the option payo. The probability of being in state i conditionally to the available information at time t can be developed as follows:
e k ∈Θ P Q (X t = e k | X ti ) = X ti exp (A(t S − t i )) e j e k ∈Θ X ti exp (A(t − t i )) e k .
And the density of the time of default of Z, conditionally to the fact that Z has gone to bankruptcy between time is equal to the following ratio:
where F t<τz (u) is the cumulative distribution of the survival time of Z,
and where f t<τ Y (u) is obtained by dierentiation:
